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Abstract 
 
 
The severe crisis affecting European Monetary Union has emphasized the prevailing interests 
of national governments and the lack of political leadership of European institutions, not to 
mention the failure of eurozone governance in terms of effective crisis management. 
The present work argues that the decisions taken in March 2011 by the European Council, 
namely the ‘Pact for the Euro’, to design the new governance of European Monetary Union 
(EMU), can be considered a necessary though insufficient step for European institutions in 
terms of credibility and legitimacy. By assessing the economic policy framework set up by the 
Pact for the Euro, this contribution underlines the need for appropriate institutions, and a 
stronger attitude of cooperation among Member States. It also stresses the need for 
transparency and a non-ambiguous solution to the debt crisis. The major message of this work  
is that Economic and Monetary Union must equip itself with the appropriate policy tools to 
manage and resolve the crisis, creating the conditions to improve the competitiveness of the 
peripheral countries of the eurozone and fostering growth. At the same time, however, 
eurozone member states and European institutions must demonstrate greater accountability 
and political coherence.  
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Introduction 
 
 
The severe crisis affecting European Monetary Union (EMU) has shown that European 
institutions are hesitant and lacking in real political leadership. At the same time it has 
emphasized the prevailing interests of national governments, and the failure of eurozone 
governance in terms of effective crisis management. 
The decisions made in March 2011 by the European Council, namely the ‘Pact for the Euro’, 
to design the new EMU governance  can be considered a necessary yet insufficient step by the 
European institutions in terms of credibility and legitimacy. The Pact for the Euro is an 
attempt to provide member states of the eurozone with new and effective national budgetary 
rules, crisis management and resolution principles and procedures, and a wider economic 
policy framework. However, several questions remain open. 
The present contribution examines the debate and proposals regarding EMU governance. In 
addition, in its critical evaluation of the economic policy framework set up by the Pact for the 
Euro, it underlines the need for appropriate institutions, and greater willingness to cooperate 
among the member states. The main message of this work is that Economic and Monetary 
Union must equip itself with appropriate policy tools to manage and resolve the crisis, 
whereas eurozone member states and European institutions must demonstrate greater 
accountability and political coherence.  
 
1. Eurozone governance and the global crisis 
 
European Monetary Union is an incomplete system, as Eichengreen and von Hagen (1996) 
make clear, since it is based on monetary union without fiscal union. This peculiar Economic 
and Monetary Union has been designed in the following way. It has a common currency, the 
euro, but does not have a significant federal budget and a form of integrated financial 
supervision. Fiscal discipline of the member states is based on the Stability and Growth Pact 
(SGP), which in practice lacks an effective enforcement mechanism
1
. Coordination of 
national fiscal policy is facilitated by the Euro group (i.e. Eurozone Financial Ministers), 
which has emerged as a forum for informal coordination. The system has been conceived with 
two safeguard clauses: i) the no-bailout clause, which establishes that national governments 
                                                 
1 France and Germany were the first two countries to fail to comply with the SGP, as in 2003-04 they lobbied to change the 
original SGP, to make it ‘more flexible’. Thus in March 2005 the European Council  reformed the SGP in order to improve 
the implementation of the Pact in accordance with the Lisbon strategy and, therefore, to extend its targets (Schilirò, 2006).  
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alone are in charge of their budget and that no European government or official institution is 
allowed to rescue another eurozone member with public debt difficulties
2
; ii) the ECB is 
barred from financing public debts.  
Banking and financial market regulations are left up to national governments, with only loose 
coordination, due to the assumption that financial markets ‘would work well’. The 
competitiveness policy has been almost overlooked in the institutional design of EMU. 
Despite the underlying weaknesses that have characterized the euro since its inception, the 
results of EMU governance were quite satisfactory until the emergence of the global crisis. 
The inflation rates of the entire eurozone were close to the target of the ECB. The adoption of 
the euro has also facilitated structural reforms in product markets
3
. Over the last decade the 
eurozone has enjoyed a high per capita income and a substantial  balance of the eurozone’s 
overall trade account
4
. Furthermore, the euro has become an important currency in the 
international monetary system, albeit not replacing the dollar as the main  currency of the 
whole system; in fact, it has carved out a significant place beyond the borders of the eurozone 
in the strictest sense, becoming the second international reserve currency after the dollar at the 
global level (Pisani-Ferry, Posen, 2009).  
With the outbreak of the global crisis of 2008-2009, probably the worst in the world economy 
since the 1930s, many countries of the eurozone have relied on state spending to drive growth, 
so they have reported a high deficit/GDP ratio and rising public debt. The average 
deficit/GDP ratio for the whole eurozone was 6.8% in 2009. Moreover, most countries also 
increased their debt; in fact only six countries out of sixteen had a debt/GDP ratio which was 
lower than 60% in 2009
5
. The debt situation, however, worsened in the eurozone in 2010 
(Eurostat, 2011). The euro zone GDP, instead, has been growing far less than budget deficit 
and public debt. All this has created deep concerns about the fiscal sustainability and the 
credibility of European Economic and Monetary Union. In particular, the member countries 
most affected by the crisis: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – the ‘GIPS’– were spending 
and living beyond their means by accumulating private and/or public debt and running large 
current account deficits. International capital markets reacted by demanding risk premiums 
for continuing to hold the public debt of GIPS.  
                                                 
2 The clause really expressed a ‘no co-responsibility’ principle for public debts (Art.125 of the Treaty), although any 
eurozone country could request assistance from the IMF. 
3 Alesina, Ardagna, Galasso (2010) have highlighted this issue, but they stress that the same  thing has not happened in the 
labour market. 
4 Actually, there have been growing current account imbalances between the northern and southern countries of the eurozone  
over time (Holinski et al. 2010). 
5 From 1980 to 2007 nearly all the OECD governments increased their indebtedness ratio; this happened because short-term 
economic needs and electoral interests prevailed over long-term sustainability issues. 
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The behaviour of all these countries, of course, has been at odds with euro participation and 
has raised the issue of the future existence of the euro. As a result, the vision of EMU 
governance and its principles has changed significantly and a debate has been opened on the 
future of the euro, while the crisis has clearly shown the ambiguity of the institutional 
architecture and the lack of coherence of European politics. 
 
 
2. The decisions of EU institutions after the global crisis 
 
 
Following the global crisis, the institutions of the European Union and individual member 
countries took a number of economic policy measures to start the process of adjustment and to 
try to solve the difficult economic and financial situation. In the spring of 2010 the EU, 
together with the IMF, decided on a programme of financial aid to help Greece, since the 
country was on the verge of insolvency. To overcome the no-bailout clause, the European 
Council approved financial aid in the form of ‘coordinated bilateral loans’ at non-discounted 
interest rates
6. Another important measure was the ECB’s ‘securities market programme’ by 
which ECB decided to buy the government debt of fiscally ‘challenged’ countries7. 
Subsequently, also the member banks of the European System of Central Banks started 
buying government debt. This measure aimed at reducing volatility in the financial markets 
and at improving liquidity. In practice, the ECB’s decision helped the member countries most 
affected by the crisis – the ‘GIPS’ –  to finance their 2010 budget deficits. 
On 9 May 2010, the 27 member states of the European Union agreed to create a 
comprehensive rescue package, a legal instrument aimed at ensuring financial stability in 
Europe. Thus the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was started to give credits to 
countries in financial troubles
8
.  The EFSF was devised in the form of a special purpose 
vehicle (SPV) that would sell bonds and use the money it raised to make loans to eurozone 
nations in need. The bonds are backed by guarantees given by the European Commission 
representing the whole EU, the eurozone member states, and the IMF. The EFSF will sell debt 
                                                 
6 In April 2010 Greece requested payment of the ‘loans’, which was approved unanimously by the European Council. 
However, the interest rate of the loans by the member states was 5%, lower than the 7% demanded by the markets. 
7 To sterilize this move, the ECB conducts liquidity absorbing operations of the same magnitude. Effectively, the ECB buys 
risky assets issued by a fiscally troubled government of the eurozone and, via its sterilization operations, sells its claims on 
banks, which is equivalent to selling new assets. This move might be viewed as an improper risk transfer. 
8
 The EFSF became operative in August 2010. It bases its rules of the crisis management regime on the principles and 
procedures of ‘IMF doctrine’. The EFSF operates in the event of unsustainable fiscal policies and sovereign debt crises. Thus 
the Greek bailout was followed by an €85 billion rescue package for Ireland in November 2010. 
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only after an aid request is made by a country. The European Financial Stability Facility 
should expire in 2013. 
 
 
3. Institutional and economic issues concerning the eurozone crisis 
 
 
The crisis inevitably opened a debate on the institutional and economic governance of the 
EMU, which has been criticized mainly because of the lack of a crisis management and 
resolution regime, the incompleteness of the economic policy framework, and the unclear role 
of the European institutions.        
Barry Eichengreen (2009) has correctly underlined the need for Europe to build up the 
institutions of its monetary union to avoid similar crises in the future. After all, the Treaty of 
Lisbon of 2007 left economic governance unchanged and it has remained incomplete and 
weak. This is demonstrated by the gap between the economic policy based on cooperation 
between member states, in which the autonomy of national governments has been maintained, 
and a monetary policy common to all States adopting the euro managed by the ECB. 
It is possible to cite some examples of the inadequacy of the institutional architecture. First, 
the relationship between the member states of the eurozone and the EU institutions (in 
particular the Commission, but also the European Parliament) is unclearly defined, because of 
the strong interests of the member states. Thus, national interests still prevail over  the 
interests of Europe and within the European institutions. Second, the European Union decides 
on a growing number of economic policy issues without having a policy at European level, 
while at national level it has defined policies without being able to find practical solutions to 
implement them. This mismatch, whose effects are clear in the euro crisis, creates an unstable 
environment and a variety of problems. Third, there is a certain awkwardness in the position 
of the ten member states of the non-eurozone, who sit on the European Council but do not 
express themselves on issues concerning the eurozone, although such decisions also influence 
the non-eurozone members. There is, therefore, a problem of transparency and legitimacy in 
the decision-making process at an institutional level.  
Fiscal policy is another controversial point. The original sin of fiscal policy in the eurozone is 
the weakness of its framework of coordination between the member states. The SGP lacks 
binding rules that make its enforcement effective; moreover the system reveals a lack of 
transparency. However, there is general agreement on the goal to maintain budget discipline 
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in each country in the medium and long term (fiscal sustainability), but with enough 
flexibility to handle cyclical adjustments in the short term. 
There are some specific proposals on fiscal policy like that of Burda and Gerlach
9
, who 
suggest a new SGP that significantly increases fiscal transparency through the creation of an 
independent committee of fiscal experts (a ‘Fiscal Stability Board’). Fatás and Mihov10 also 
agree on the crucial role of an independent institution (i.e. a fiscal policy council) to monitor 
and enforce national fiscal policy. Weber (2010), instead, is against any discretionary decision 
concerning the sanctions. He suggests installing a system of automatic sanctions. In addition, 
Weber argues that it is not sufficient to focus on the budget deficit alone, as was done in the 
past; it is also necessary to place more emphasis on the level of national debt. 
Another important issue is the role of the banking system. The crisis in the eurozone could be 
less severe if the banks had been strong enough and not interconnected with sovereign debt
11
. 
Thus many scholars have argued that the main causes of the crisis were the increasing debt 
and the serious difficulties of the banking system, which were inevitably intertwined. The 
fragility of banks and their interconnectedness with the debt crisis created a severe 
macroeconomic problem. During the crisis the governance of the eurozone revealed the lack 
of a coordinated banking policy, which is crucial for crisis management. Moreover, according 
to Baldwin and Gros (Baldwin et al., 2010, p.16): 
 
banking policy failed to provide capital cushions large enough to absorb a GIPS debt crisis 
without putting the core nations’ banking systems at risk.  
 
Thus an important economic policy target to avoid crises is to maintain the stability of the 
banking system. 
An additional relevant point is that the crisis has exposed flaws in the peer review process, 
which put disproportionate emphasis on fiscal discipline. At the same time, no one was 
paying attention to excessive home consumption and to the current account deficits, due to the 
false convergence between post-EMU-launch bond yields, which left the ‘GIPS’ countries 
borrowing at rates little higher than those of Germany, leading to large speculative inflows, 
higher wages and a loss of competitiveness. 
                                                 
9 Burda, Gerlach in Baldwin et al. (2010, pp.65-68). 
10 Fatás, Mihov in Baldwin et al. (2010, pp.69-72). 
11 Banks of the northern countries of the eurozone (especially France and Germany) are largely exposed to the peripheral 
countries. 
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But a major reason why the global financial crisis struck the eurozone so severely was that it 
coincided with the lack of appropriate policy tools to manage the crisis and a period of weak 
political leadership which has made crisis management even harder. 
Pisani-Ferry (2010) has argued that it is necessary to reformulate the economic policy 
framework, also taking into account the problems of competitiveness, of trade imbalances and 
of low and uneven growth inside the eurozone
12
.  
 
4. Debt crisis management proposals 
 
 
Outlined below are some specific proposals on debt crisis management, offering the most 
appropriate solution to deal with it. 
Gianviti et al. (2010) start from the consideration that EU members have agreed to cooperate 
through supranational institutions within a common legal framework. Gianviti and his 
colleagues propose the creation of a European Crisis Resolution Mechanism (ECRM), 
established by a treaty, containing rules for the provision of financial assistance to eurozone 
countries as a step towards resolving the crisis in an effective and foreseeable way
13
. The 
ECRM includes procedures for conducting negotiations between a sovereign debtor with 
unsustainable debt and its creditors, leading to, and enforcing, an agreement on debt 
restructuring, in order to re-establish the sustainability of its public finances
14
. The ECMR 
acknowledges the possibility of a government defaulting on its debt. This possibility of 
default is a warning to creditors, so that they will differentiate between sovereign debt issuers. 
Gros and Mayer (2010) make a slightly different proposal for debt crisis management. They 
suggest the creation of a European Monetary Fund (EMF), set up under the concept of 
‘enhanced cooperation’ established in the EU Treaty and aimed at financing a mechanism 
capable of managing the orderly default and debt restructuring of a government within the 
EMU
15
. The design of the EMF considers the organization of this orderly sovereign default as 
a measure of last resort and it implies some effective enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore,  
the funds are structured in such a way as to minimize moral hazard
16
. An important result of 
the creation of the EMF is that it would contribute decisively to the release of the ECB from 
                                                 
12 Moreover, a policy regime is only complete if it suggests appropriate behaviour in different conditions (in both good and 
bad times). Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (in Pisani-Ferry, Posen 2009, p.71) argue that the qualities expected from a policy system 
in times of crisis are clearly different from those expected from the same system in normal times. 
13 Gianviti et al. require that when a country is found insolvent, the provision of financial aid should be conditional on the 
agreement between the debtor and the creditors to re-establish solvency. The task of supplying financial assistance could be 
given to the ESFS provided that it is made a permanent institution of the European Union (2010, p.5).  
14 The Court of Justice of the European Union is the natural institution to deal with such cases (Gianviti et al., 2010, p.4). 
15 Gros, Mayer (2010, p.5). 
16 Gros and Mayer are aware that the moral hazard problem can never be completely neutralized, but their proposal limits it. 
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her improper role as a bad bank
17
. Finally, the EMF is designed to let debtor countries and 
creditors participate in the costs of sovereign default according to the costs-by-cause principle 
(Belke, 2010).  
Among the proposals for the governance of sovereign debt in the eurozone is the idea of 
creating a common or centralized public debt instrument, establishing a single issuer of 
sovereign debt, since eurozone government bond markets remain fragmented. Testifying to 
this fragmentation are persistent interest-rate differentials which, during the 2009 crisis, 
widened from less than 30 basis points one year after the introduction of the euro, to 300 basis 
points for Greece and 150 basis points for Italian bonds
18
. A European government bond 
(‘Eurobond’) jointly issued by the eurozone member states, if appropriately designed, could 
offer significant advantages in terms of efficiency to the issuing governments of the eurozone, 
but also to investors and financial intermediaries, and it could contribute to fiscal stability. As 
Favero and Missale (2010, p. 91) maintain:  
 
a common Eurobond is a strong form of debt management cooperation with the potential of 
promoting further market integration, greater liquidity and lower borrowing costs.  
 
It is possible to distinguish between several types of Eurobond
19
, but Favero and Missale 
argue that a Eurobond issued by an EU institution (and probably by all eurozone member 
states) would be perceived as being of the highest credit quality and could compete with the 
US Treasuries.  
Many proposals have been put forward on Eurobonds: Gros, Micossi (2009); Boonstra 
(2010); Delpla, von Weizsäcker (2010); Junker, Tremonti (2010); Quadrio Curzio (2011); 
Bini Smaghi (2011). In particular, Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010, 2011) propose Blue 
Bonds to tackle the sovereign debt crisis and allow the countries of the eurozone to return to 
fiscal sustainability. They suggest that sovereign debt in these countries can be split into two 
parts. The first part, the senior ‘Blue’ tranche of up to 60 percent of GDP, would be pooled 
among participating countries and jointly and severally guaranteed: thus it constitutes a 
common European government bond. The second part, the ‘Red’ tranche which is the national 
debt beyond a country’s Blue Bond allocation that should be issued as national and junior 
debt, would keep debt in excess of 60 percent of GDP as a purely national responsibility. This 
                                                 
17 Intervening in the secondary market of government bonds, the ECB funds ‘de facto’ government deficits and thus helps 
countries in financial distress.  
18 The Greek crisis led the Greek spread to a value of nearly 1000 basis points, affecting also the Italian spread, which 
reached almost 200 basis points (Favero, Missale, 2010). 
19  Favero, Missale (2010, pp. 99-100). 
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proposal has, according to Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2011, p.2), two interesting features. 
The Blue Bonds would constitute an extremely liquid and safe asset on a par with the US T-
bond. This should help the euro’s rise as a major reserve currency, enabling the entire 
eurozone to borrow part of the sovereign debt at interest rates comparable to the benchmark 
German bond. Furthermore, the Red Bonds would help to enforce fiscal discipline. They 
would make borrowing more expensive at the margin. In any case the Red Bonds cannot be 
bailed out by any EU mechanism (i.e. EFSF, etc.). 
The Quadrio Curzio (2011) proposal of a UnionEuroBond, instead, has broader goals. This 
proposal is based on the creation of a Euro-Development Fund (EDF) with assets consisting 
of the gold reserves of the eurozone countries and with a governance where the weight of 
each member state is related to its GDP. This Fund can issue public debt securities. Financial 
resources, collected with the issuance of securities, are intended in part to fund the national 
public debt securities, paying a lower interest rate than the current one, partly to help the 
European banking system and European industry and partly to finance the infrastructure 
within the UE, which is an old idea of Jacques Delors. 
The first argument against the Eurobond is that its launch would add a new market to the 
existing national markets and therefore increase fragmentation. Thus the Eurobonds should 
replace national bonds on a large scale and quickly create a thick market to promote market 
integration, enhance liquidity and provide a safe-haven international benchmark. However, 
the transition process can involve high initial set-up costs
20
. A second criticism is that the 
management of each member state’s total debt could become more complex, since centralized 
funding would raise coordination issues and would reduce flexibility in the pursuit of country-
specific debt management objectives.  A third argument is  that Eurobonds (like, for instance, 
the Blue Bonds) tend to be overly generous towards weaker countries in terms of access to 
borrowing. Moreover, the Eurobond solution could become a trap in the medium-long term 
for the weaker countries if fiscal adjustments were unsuccessful. In fact these countries would 
eventually be forced to issue domestic bonds at conditions which are even more prohibitive 
than the present ones. Finally, the real political obstacle for Eurobonds is the EU Treaty, 
which would have to be amended
21
. Related to the latter criticism is the view that Eurobonds 
determine a sort of socialization of interest, i.e. debtor countries charge the creditor countries 
for the cost of the debt. This result does not appeal to creditor countries like Germany, since 
legitimately they would refuse a monetary union were it to become a mere transfer  union. 
                                                 
20 Favero, Missale (2010, 103) 
21 By pooling fiscal policy, the Eurobonds would require changes to the treaty which it seems doubtful that all 27 members 
would accept. A solution could be a new Treaty for the eurozone. 
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Nevertheless, the Eurobonds, depending on the way in which they are conceived, could be a 
useful instrument for overcoming the debt crisis. However, they become truly helpful only 
within a comprehensive and credible economic policy framework and a new strategy of EMU 
governance. 
 
5. Towards new EMU governance  
 
 
The persistence of the crisis in the eurozone has pushed the UE institutions and member states 
to take action. The European Council, therefore, made two relevant decisions in March 2011. 
The first was a new competitiveness pact, called ‘A Pact for the Euro’, the second  an 
agreement regarding the funding of a permanent eurozone rescue fund, the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM). The ESM agreement, which implies a small Treaty change permitted by 
the simplified treaty revision procedure
22
, is part of a wider deal on measures to ensure the 
stability of the eurozone and improve economic coordination. 
The European Commission, back in 2010, stated that there are two other important objectives 
of economic policy in addition to price stability and fiscal discipline: one is financial stability, 
which has become evident and necessary following the crisis,  the other is the avoidance – or 
at least the limitation – of macroeconomic imbalances. The recent measures, taken in March 
2011, are aimed at completing the economic policy framework in terms of objectives and 
instruments. 
The Pact for the Euro, which has to do with economic governance per se, aims to achieve 
better economic policy coordination leading to a higher degree of convergence. The Pact 
‘focuses primarily on areas that fall under national competence and are key for increasing 
competitiveness and avoiding harmful imbalances’ (European Council, 2011). The goals of 
the Pact for the Euro are: fostering competitiveness, fostering employment, contributing 
further to the sustainability of public finances, reinforcing financial stability. 
In addition, the Pact includes important commitments towards crisis prevention that regard 
legislative measures to strengthen eurozone budget rules. The new regime will take into 
account the debt ratio and implicit liabilities
23
.  
The Pact also make it harder for politicians to veto fines imposed on recalcitrant debtors. A 
positive aspect included in this new economic policy framework is the recognition that not all 
crises are rooted in a lack of budgetary discipline. It is now agreed that financial stability and 
                                                 
22 The simplified treaty revision procedure requires, however, a unanimous decision of the European Council and does not 
enter into force until it is approved by the member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
23 So that a country with an oversized banking sector will have to factor in potential rescue costs. 
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macroeconomic stability also matter.  The Pact for the Euro commits the euro partners to 
closer economic coordination and to a series of new austerity measures, including close 
monitoring of pension schemes, and limits on public sector wage increases. As it stands, 
however, the Pact for the Euro remains an agreement on principle without real enforcement
24
. 
Since the Pact for the Euro focuses on competitiveness and envisages an EMU that will not 
become a transfer union, Carfì and Schilirò (2011a, 2011b) suggest an approach based on co-
petition. First, they point out the primary role of competitiveness in determining growth and 
the important relationship between competitiveness and macroeconomic imbalances. Carfì 
and Schilirò have argued that to overcome macroeconomic imbalances a medium term 
strategy for competitiveness and growth is necessary, based on innovative investments and a 
process of structural change of the production system. Within this broad strategy, trade 
imbalances in particular can be addressed through a co-petitive  strategy. This implies a 
cooperative attitude aiming at growth among the member countries of the eurozone, despite 
their divergent interests. The co-petitive  strategy will provide players with a win-win solution 
and could constitute a new macroeconomic policy tool to help solve the imbalance problems 
and contribute to overcoming the economic crisis in a medium-term perspective
25
. 
However, the measures concerning the crisis resolution, which encompass the creation of a 
permanent eurozone rescue fund – the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) – contribute 
significantly to outlining the new governance of the EMU. 
First, the SGP was improved and toughened, but the new SGP does not dispose of any 
mechanism to override national sovereignty. It has thus become a complement to the 
government insolvency mechanism. Second, it is known that the Maastricht Treaty’s no-
bailout clause, which limited cooperation between the member countries of the European 
Economic Monetary Union, stressed the individual responsibility of the governments and 
emphasized a strong faith in the market’s capacity to overcome any difficulties. This clause 
turned out to be too rigid and unrealistic in times of crisis. Similarly, the new rules of EMU 
governance have transformed the old no-bailout clause into another unrealistic rule 
concerning the crisis resolution. In fact, the leaders of the eurozone committed themselves to 
increasing the lending capacity of the current rescue fund, the EFSF
26
, enabling it to bail out 
several eurozone countries if the debt crisis were to continue to spread
27
. They also 
                                                 
24 Germany and the President of the ECB, Trichet, backed a more binding version that included the possibility of sanctions 
for violators. 
25 Carfì, Schilirò (2011, pp. 5-6, pp. 17-18) 
26 From about €250bn to its full, headline level of €440bn. 
27 Greece and Ireland were the two troubled eurozone countries that asked the European Union for emergency support to 
ensure that they could continue to finance their debt. Portugal became the third in April 2011. 
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established the creation of a permanent post-2013 fund – the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM) – which will be able to lend up to €500bn, likely to be achieved through guarantees 
from triple-A states. In the face of German and Dutch resistance, the leaders chose to set some 
limits. The fund will be able to buy bonds, but only directly from a struggling government and 
only after that government agrees to austerity measures. However, these new financial 
facilities can only be used in a narrow set of circumstances
28
, which limit their application and 
convenience for struggling countries. 
The agreement reached by eurozone leaders  has been a typical political compromise. 
Unfortunately, compromise does not necessarily work in a debt crisis. There are, in essence, 
two ways to solve a debt crisis: through a bailout or through default. The leaders of the 
eurozone came to an arrangement which is merely an emergency facility and constitutes a 
scarcely credible intermediate solution between bailout and default. 
To understand this agreement, it is important to focus on some technical aspects of the 
financial rescue mechanisms. The current EFSF will run out in 2013. It gives credits to 
countries in trouble and may soon buy their bonds on the primary markets as they rank on the 
same terms as everybody else’s investments. On the whole, this means that, should the 
country default, everybody gets hit equally. Creditor nations, such as France and Germany, 
would not allow a default of a GIPS country (say Greece) until 2013, because it would be a 
political disaster for their governments. In 2013, the new ESM will replace the EFSF. The 
crucial difference between the two is that the ESM’s credits will be superior to those of 
private investors. The idea is to make default possible, with only a moderate risk to the budget 
of the creditor nations. By 2013, the European banks should be in a better position than today 
to absorb big losses, or so it is hoped; this could therefore be the end of the crisis. 
Unfortunately, financial markets follow a different reasoning. What has been happening is 
that forward-looking investors see through this scheme and correctly assess the risk of a 
future default, also for existing bonds. They know that once a country defaults, old and new 
bonds will be treated alike. Thus policymakers in Germany or France are just as unlikely to 
push for a managed default in 2013 as they are now. In 2013 the crisis will not be over, so the 
game of lending at high interest rates in exchange for austerity plans will continue, until the 
debtor country’s economy collapses under its debt burden, at which point default will be 
inevitable and very unpleasant
29
.  
                                                 
28 The fund will  provide assistance only as a last resort, by unanimity and with harsh conditions. 
29 The current policymakers may no longer be in office by then and can therefore blame their successors for the mess.  
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All debt crises are politically difficult to solve because they involve making choices about 
who – the borrowers, the lenders or the taxpayers – will ultimately bear the burden of the 
accumulated debt. The comprehensive solution to the eurozone crisis cannot avoid some 
difficult, but inevitable and transparent political choices. A reasonable and coherent solution 
could be, for instance, to accept the principle of a bailout, not through cross-country transfers, 
but by means of effective reforms to enable countries to restructure their economies and keep 
their budget in balance, and also of a common European bond that replaces all or part of 
national debt
30
.  
Despite the step forward made by the European Council in March 2011 with its measures on 
crisis resolution and competitiveness, some problems remain unsolved. First, there is still 
some ambiguity in the economic policy framework, regarding, for instance, fiscal 
sustainability and the new SGP, but there is also a lack of clarity regarding the weight and the 
role of the national governments towards the European institutions. Second, there is an urgent 
need to expedite the resolution of the banking crisis. Many European banks still have in their 
balance sheet too many ‘toxic assets’ and risky sovereign bonds. Third, an equally important 
point is that the European authorities must distinguish between state insolvency cases and 
illiquidity cases (Greece is likely to find itself insolvent), since this lack of clarity  is putting 
the entire system at risk. Fourth, there is the issue of an exit strategy for the ECB for getting 
rid of the peripheral bonds on its balance sheet
31
. Fifth, the question of how the eurozone 
periphery will achieve debt sustainability, since there is still no serious answer to the problem 
of sustainability of public debt. Finally, the eurozone needs a strategy to revive growth, 
particularly in southern Europe, keeping the public budget in balance. As I have already 
argued, a co-petitive strategy can be part of this wide strategy for growth. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
  
The new governance of EMU, based on the Pact for the Euro, is a partial answer to the 
persistent crisis of the eurozone. The solutions provided go some way to correcting previous 
weaknesses. However, several issues remain.  
This contribution has underlined the need for greater cooperation between the member 
countries to implement economic policies, a co-petitive strategy to face some macroeconomic 
                                                 
30 Despite criticisms, the idea of Eurobonds has many supporters like Monti (2010), Junker and Tremonti (2010), Quadrio 
Curzio (2010, 2011).  
31 The ECB holds 49 billion euro of sovereign Greek bonds. 
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imbalances and a more effective fiscal policy regime. It has also stressed the need for 
transparency, accountability and a clear solution to the debt crisis. In addition, the good health 
of the banking system is very important as is the sustainability of the debt burden of the 
peripheral countries. Just as crucial is a medium-term strategy for growth, based on reforms 
that improve the competitiveness of peripheral countries of the eurozone, which should help 
the economies of the EMU grow out of public debt. 
However, the feeling is that the European authorities still believe they do not have the 
necessary governance mechanisms for making important decisions. Besides, the weak and 
divided EU institutions have tax revenues of less than 2% of the European GDP. Furthermore, 
any major decision taken by the EU institutions requires unanimity and this rule applies 
regardless of the debt position of the member countries, without transparency. Finally, 
national interests are too strong and tend to prevail over the European institutions. 
In conclusion, in this contribution I envisage the idea that for  Economic and Monetary Union 
to survive in the medium-long term, the European institutions must provide an effective crisis 
resolution system, based on a European Monetary Fund that can issue a common European 
bond (‘Eurobond’), but within a new governance strategy. The necessary condition for the 
success of this crisis solution is better and more effective fiscal policy coordination, which 
keeps the national budget of the euro countries in balance. However, in perspective, the EMU 
should overcome its asymmetric and incomplete architecture at institutional level and move 
towards fiscal union. In addition, the governance of the EMU must ensure more transparency, 
demand greater accountability from member countries, make reforms to enable the countries 
to restructure their economies and promote real cooperation between the member states, 
without becoming a simple union which transfers resources. 
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